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Abstract This paper describes a case study in refining an abstract se-
curity protocol description down to a concrete implementation on a Java
Card smart card. The aim is to consider the decisions that have to be
made in the development of such an implementation in a systematic way,
and to investigate the possibilities of formal specification and verification
in the design process and for the final implementation.
1 Introduction
Security protocols play a crucial role in pervasive computing, e.g. in ensuring
authentication of different devices communicating over networks, or encryption
of communications between these devices. There has been a lot of work on rea-
soning about security protocols over the past years, for example BAN logic [3]
or state exploration based analysis using model checkers [12]. Still, there is a big
gap between the abstract level at which such protocols are typically studied and
the concrete level at which they are implemented. This is unsatisfactory since
ultimately we are interested in properties of the concrete implementation.
This raises several questions: Which choices have to be made in the process
of implementing a protocol and how do these affect the security of the imple-
mentation? Which properties of the abstract description also hold for a concrete
implementation? What additional properties have to be worried about if for in-
stance one of the agents participating in the protocol is running on a smart card
and can therefore be subject to sudden loss of power at any moment?
Our aim is to investigate possible notations, techniques, and tools that can
help in answering these questions. Rather than trying to make more precise
what is meant by “the security of an implementation”, the approach taken in
this paper is to consider the kind of properties that we know how to specify and
verify with today’s tools and to see how these can contribute to secure protocol
implementations.
This paper discusses a case study in refining a security protocol from the
abstract description down to an actual implementation, where one of the agents
is implemented on a smart card, using Java Card, a “dialect” of Java for pro-
gramming smart cards. We investigate the choices that have to be made in this
process by looking at formal descriptions of the protocol at different levels of
abstraction and the properties we want to specify and verify.
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The relation between the abstract protocol description and the final Java
implementation is shown in Fig. 1. Our long term goal is to prove that the
abstract protocol
refinement 1: extending
®¶
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refinement 2: input enabling
®¶
refined protocol 2
refinement 3: smartcard specific
®¶
refined protocol 3
implement
®¶
formally specified Java (Card) implementation
Figure1. Refinement overview
implementation of the protocol ensures the security properties we are interested
in. For the moment we have to content ourselves with
– accurately specifying the different refinements that lead from the abstract
protocol to the implementation and making the design decisions underlying
these refinements explicit; this is done in Section 3.
– using the formal specification language JML (Java Modeling Language [7])
and two tools that support JML, namely the runtime assertion checker for
JML [?] and the static checker ESC/Java [13], to ensure that the Java code
correctly implements the final refinement of the protocol; this is done in
Section 4.
Section 2 first describes the abstract protocol that we want to implement.
2 The abstract protocol
For this case study we use the protocol for bilateral key exchange (BKE) with
public key described in [5, § 6.6.6]. This protocol allows two agents to agree
on a session key. One of the agents will be implemented as a so-called smart
card applet, i.e. a program executing on a smart card. It could, for example,
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be running on a mobile phone SIM or a credit card. The other agent will be
an off-card application, communicating with the smart card applet via a smart
card reader and possibly some network connection. The protocol consists of three
messages. In conventional notation for security protocols, it reads as follows:
1. B → A : B, {Nb, B}Ka
2. A → B : {f(Nb), Na, A,K}Kb
3. B → A : {f(Na)}K
Here A and B are the two agents, Na and Nb are the nonces (challenges) from
A and B, and Ka and Kb are the public keys of A and B, respectively. The
function f is a hash function and {. . .}K denotes the data . . . encrypted using
key K.
Figure 2 presents an alternative description of the protocol as two simple
finite automata, one for each agent. (These automata are almost identical, but
in the course of introducing more implementation details the automata for the
two agents will become different.) Initial states are indicated by extra circles.
All transitions are labeled with messages and either a ?, in case of an incoming
message, or ! in case of an outgoing message. This is standard CSP notation.
Msg2Sent
InitialState
Msg3Received
Msg1Received
Msg1?
Msg2!
Msg3?
Principal A
InitialState
Msg2Received
Msg1Sent
Msg3Sent
Msg1!
Msg2?
Msg3!
Principal B
Figure2. Abstract BKE protocol
We used Casper [8] in combination with the model checker FDR2 [14] to
prove that this protocol does indeed ensure mutual authentication and secrecy
of the session key.
The abstract protocol only describes the initial handshake between A and B
that establishes a session key. It does not say how this session key is actually
used afterwards. For an actual implementation we do of course want to use the
session key to encrypt subsequent communications between A and B. Therefore
we extend the protocol as follows:
1. B → A : B, {Nb, B}Ka
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2. A → B : {f(Nb), Na, A,K}Kb
3. B → A : {f(Na)}K
4. A → B : {KeyOK}K
5. B → A : {Msg . . .}K
6. A → B : {Msg . . .}K
...
2n. B → A : {Msg . . .}K
2n+ 1. A → B : {Msg . . .}K
2n+ 2. B → A : {End}K
Here KeyOK is an acknowledgment message sent to agent B in order to make sure
that B knows he is allowed to send regular messages. This message is not really
needed: if agent A would simply start to send a regular message using K, agent
B could know that the suggested key has been accepted. The message End ends
the session. This extension leads to the automata in Fig. 3.
InitialState
Msg1Received
Msg2Sent
Msg3Received
KeyEstablished
Msg1?
Msg2!
Msg3?
KeyOK!
Msg! Msg?
End?
Principal A
InitialState
Msg1Sent
Msg2Received
Msg3Sent
KeyEstablished
Msg1!
Msg2?
Msg3!
KeyOK?
Msg! Msg?
End!
Principal B
Figure3. Extended BKE state-transition diagram
3 Refinements
3.1 Anything that can go wrong . . .
Several things can go wrong during a protocol run:
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1. We can get an unsolicited message. For example, agent A could be in its
initial state and receive message Msg3? from agent B, whereas it is expect-
ing Msg1?. In this case we say that the agents are “out of sync”, which is
something that could happen as a consequence of messages being lost. Note
that Fig. 3 does not specify what should happen if this situation occurs.
2. An exception may be thrown while processing expected messages. For instance,
an agent may receive an incorrectly encrypted message. For example, agent B
could receive a first response message1 of agent A that is not of the required
form {f(Nb), Na, A,K}Kb . Note that the protocol as is doesn’t provide any
guarantee for message integrity.
3. An agent may fail to receive any message at all, due to a basic failure of the
communication channel between the two agents.
Decision 1 1. Receiving an unsolicited message ends the current session, i.e.
an agent receiving an unsolicited message will move to its initial state. The
only exception to this is if Agent A receives an unsolicited message Msg1?; in
that case a new session will immediately start and Agent A will go to state
Msg1Received.
2. In case an exception is thrown, for instance when an agent receives an incor-
rectly encrypted message, the agent will go back to its InitialState (and
sends a special message XcB! back to the other agent).
3. An agent noticing a failure of the communication channel will go back to its
InitialState.
These decisions result in the new state-transition diagrams given in Fig. 4.
In order to keep these diagrams readable, two abbreviations are introduced.
First, dummy states are introduced (indicated in Fig. 4 as the white states in the
upper corners). Such a dummy state is to be seen as an abbreviation for all states.
So, for example, from each state we have a transition to InitialState labeled
XcB?. Without the upper right dummy state our diagram would be cluttered
with five extra arrows.
Second, the label XcB? is an abbreviation for “all other messages”, i.e. all
possible messages that are not mentioned explicitly in the diagram. For example,
consider the state Msg2Sent of agent A in Fig. 4. Two outgoing transitions,
labelled with Msg3? and Msg1?, are drawn from this state. By the convention
discussed above, there is also an implicit transition to InitialState labeled
XcB?. Here XcB? now stands for any message other than Msg3? and Msg1?. So,
from Msg2Sent we can move to Msg1Received by Msg1?, to Msg3Received by
Msg3?, and to InitialState by any other message (i.e. Msg? or End? is received.
3.2 Initialization phase
Before the protocol can be used, some initialization has to be performed: each
agent has to get its private and public key, and has to know the public key of the
1 We assume that the messages are labeled so it is clear which message is received.
In the Java Card implementation this is typically done by means of the so-called
instruction byte.
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InitialState
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Msg1?
Msg2!
Msg3?
Msg1?
Msg1?
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Msg1?
End?
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Figure4. Extended BKE state-transition diagram with exceptional behavior included
other agent. All diagrams above start in the InitialState in which we assume
the agents know all the relevant keys. In an actual implementation we will have
to take care of this initialization phase.
PreBKE
InitialState
Issue!
Set?Status!
Status!
Principal A
PreBKE
InitialState
Issue!
Set!Status?
Status?
Trusted Principal
Figure5. Initialization phase
To model this, the automata should be extended with the automata of Fig. 5.
Notice how this affects the initial state of the automaton. The initialization
phase involves communication with another agent, some trusted principal that
tells agent A the public keys of the agents that the applet should be able to
communicate with later on. We assume the initialization takes place in a trusted
environment, and the smart card applet will ensure that initialization can only
take place once by toggling a personalization flag. For the sake of the presen-
tation, we will avoid talking about this PreBKE state in the diagrams below.
However, in the JML specifications ofr the actual code we present later on it will
turn up again.
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3.3 Applet selection and persistent vs. transient memory
Java Card smart cards are multi-application smart cards, which means that
several applets can be installed on one smart card. As a consequence, before we
can communicate with a Java Card applet on a smart card, we tell the smart
card which applet we want to communicate with. This is done by sending a
select command to the smart card.
Decision 2 If the card has been issued, the resulting state after a select com-
mand is always InitialState. If the card has not been issued, the state will be
PreBKE.
There are two kinds of memory available on a smart card: there is persistent
memory, EEPROM, which keeps its value if the card has no power, and there
is transient memory, RAM, which loses its value as soon as the power supply to
the smart card is interrupted. By default, all objects are allocated in persistent
memory, but an applet can choose to allocate some fields in transient memory.
Such fields will be reset to default initial value, e.g. 0 for numerical fields, by the
smart card operating system when the card powers up.
Decision 3 All session-oriented information such as nonces, the state of the
protocol, and the session key are kept in transient memory. The other infor-
mation like the card’s id, public keys and the personalization flag is stored in
persistent memory.
3.4 Card tears
A smart card applet can suddenly lose power due to a so-called card tear, e.g.
when a card is removed from a card reader (or, in the case of a GSM SIM, when
the battery of the mobile phone runs down). What should be the behavior of the
smart card applet implementing agent A when a card tear happens? Of course,
the applet will not be able to do anything after the card tear happens, as it will
stop executing, but it can do something the next time the smart card powers up
again and the applet is selected once again.
Decision 4 It follows from Decisions 2 and 3 that after a card tear, the subse-
quent powering up, and selection of the applet, the new state is InitialState
and of course all the transient memory is erased. This means that any session
in progress is closed.
Figure 6 later on makes these issues explicit. We have introduced two real states,
CardInserted and CardReady, and one dummy state. As before, the dummy
state can be seen as a union of all real states. So, the CardTear transition from
this new dummy state to the state CardInserted can be taking from any state
in the diagram.
The name CardInserted may seem strange. The CardTear transition does not
mean that after a card tear this automaton goes immediately to CardInserted.
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As soon as a card tear happens, the current session or the current automaton
is stopped completely. Nothing will happen until the card is re-inserted again.
In particular no transitions can be triggered during a card tear. Therefore this
CardTear transition is only triggered at the re-insertion.
When the card is re-inserted the powering up takes place. In particular the
terminal resets the card. The card responds to this by sending an Answer to
Reset (ATR). After this the card is ready and waiting for a select command
from the terminal.
3.5 Command-response pairs
Communication with a smart card uses the ISO7816 protocol, in which the
terminal acts as a master and the smart card as a slave. The terminal sends
commands, to which the card answers with a response. The messages sent be-
tween terminal and smart card are called APDUs (Application Protocol Data
Unit) in ISO7816, which are just sequences of bytes. In our protocol agent A is
implemented as a smart card and B as an application with access to the card
terminal.
This means that all outgoing messages from A need to be triggered by an
incoming message from B. And vice versa all incoming messages need to be
followed by an outgoing message. Of course it would be possible to let agent
A respond to all messages from B by sending a status word only. However, it
seems more efficient to fill the response APDUs with the expected answers and
a status word. For instance Msg1 will be implemented as a command APDU and
Msg2 will be implemented as the corresponding response APDU.
This choice has consequences for the states in the applet. After receiving
Msg1? the applet will be in the state Msg1Received. However, before it tries to
do anything else it will try to send back Msg2!. If this succeeds the resulting
state will be Msg2Sent. If this fails the resulting state will be InitialState. In
particular, this means the applet can never remain in state Msg1Received for
any length of time, as the transition to this state –by a command APDU– will
always be followed immediately by another transition out of this state –by the
matching response APDU. This means that it is no longer possible for any incom-
ing unsolicited message to be received in this intermediate state Msg1Received.
Technically this means that some of the arrows in the diagram for agent A can
now be omitted. However, because we used dummy states in our diagrams we
do not see this in our representation. Only the interpretation of the notion of
dummy state is weakened slightly.
Decision 5 We need one extra response APDU Status!: it will act as a re-
sponse to SelectApplet?, End? and XcB?.
Below are the command-response pairs that may occur.
Commands Msg1? Msg3? Msg? End? XcB? SelectApplet?
Responses Msg2! KeyOK! Msg! Status! Status! Status!
XcB! XcB! XcB!
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The way we implemented this affects the meaning of the message Msg!. Although
it still appears in the diagram for principal A, it is now restricted to being used
as an answer to the Msg? message. The applet will no longer be able to send
Msg! on its own initiative! Furthermore, adding the necessary Status! response
on the applet side implies also adding Status? on the terminal side.
InitialState
Msg1Received
Msg2Sent
Msg3Received
KeyEstablished
CardReady
CardInserted
Msg1?
Msg2!
Msg3?
Msg1?
Msg1?
Msg1?
KeyOK!
Msg! Msg?
Msg1?
End?
XcB?XcB!
ATR!
SelectApplet?
CardTear?
Status!
Principal A
InitialState
Msg1Sent
Msg2Received
Msg3Sent
KeyEstablished
CardReady
CardInserted
Msg1!
Msg2?
Msg3!
KeyOK?
Msg! Msg?
End!
XcB?XcB!
CardTear?
ATR?
SelectApplet!
Status?
Principal B
Figure6. Extended BKE state-transition diagram with exceptional behavior, card tear
recovery, and paired APDUs included
Obviously the changes we have discussed here have an impact on the protocol
as we presented it earlier. We need to add a single line:
2n+ 3. A → B : {Status}K
Fig. 6 shows the corresponding state-transition diagram.
4 Using JML
This section considers the use of the Java Modeling Language (JML, see [7]) and
tools that support JML to ensure that our Java (Card) implementation correctly
implements the final refinement of the protocol discussed in the previous section.
JML is a specification language that can be used to formally specify the behavior
of Java programs.
4.1 JML specifications
Fortunately, state-transition diagrams describing the required behavior of the
agents can easily be translated into JML. (The only problem is how to deal with
specifying the card tear mechanism; this is discussed in Section 4.4.)
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In order to describe the rest of the diagram in Fig. 6 we use two instance vari-
ables. Namely the instance variable personalized, stored in persistent memory,
that keeps track of whether the card has been issued or not, and the instance
variable bke_state[0], stored in transient memory, that records the state in
the protocol. (In Java Card only arrays can be allocated in transient memory.
Therefore bke_state is a transient array of length 1.)
The diagrams of Figures 5 and 6 can be expressed by a combination of JML
invariants, constraints, and method specifications.
In JML, as is usual, invariants are predicates which should be established
by the constructor and preserved by the methods, i.e. invariants should hold
after an invocation of a constructor, and both before and after any method
invocation). E.g. the invariants in the JML specification below give the possible
values of the applet state bke_state[0], and the relation between this state and
the personalized flag.
In JML constraints are relations that should be respected by all methods,
i.e. the pre- and post-state of any method invocation should be in the relation
specified by a constraint. E.g. the constraint in the JML specification below
specifies that once a card has been personalized, it will remain personalized
forever.
/*@ invariant
@ bke_state[0] == PRE_BKE || bke_state[0] == INIT ||
@ bke_state[0] == MSG1_RECEIVED || bke_state[0] == MSG2_SENT ||
@ bke_state[0] == MSG3_RECEIVED || bke_state[0] == KEY_ESTABLISHED;
@ invariant personalized <==> (bke_state[0] != PRE_BKE);
@ constraint \old(personalized) ==> personalized;
@*/
Based upon the automata in Fig. 5 and 6, and given these constraints and
invariants, it is easy to give JML specifications for the methods that specify the
desired flow of control. Below we give the method specification of the process
method.
/*@ behavior
@ requires true;
@ ensures (\old(bke_state[0]) == PRE_BKE ==>
@ (bke_state[0] == \old(bke_state[0]) || bke_state[0] == INIT));
@ ensures (\old(bke_state[0]) == INIT ==>
@ (bke_state[0] == \old(bke_state[0]) || bke_state[0] == MSG2_SENT));
@ ensures (\old(bke_state[0]) == MSG2_SENT ==>
@ (bke_state[0] == \old(bke_state[0]) ||
@ bke_state[0] == KEY_ESTABLISHED ||
@ bke_state[0] == INIT));
@ ensures (\old(bke_state[0]) == KEY_ESTABLISHED ==>
@ (bke_state[0] == \old(bke_state[0]) || bke_state[0] == INIT ||
@ bke_state[0] == MSG2_SENT ));
@ signals (Exception) (\old(bke_state[0]) == PRE_BKE ==>
@ bke_state[0] == PRE_BKE);
@ signals (Exception) (\old(bke_state[0]) != PRE_BKE ==>
@ bke_state[0] == INIT);
Implementing a Security Protocol in Java Card 11
@*/
public void process(APDU apdu) throws ISOException
The method specification consists of a precondition (indicated by requires),
postconditions for normal termination (indicated by ensures), and postcondi-
tions for abnormal termination (indicated by signals). All ensures clauses
should be considered together as a logical conjunction. The first ensures clause
is specifically for the initialization phase. The signals clauses should be consid-
ered as a conjunction as well. There are two lines here because we need to make
a distinction between whether a card has been issued or not.
Below we give the specification of the receiveMsg1 method. On the top
level we see new keywords also and exceptional_behavior. The also splits
the specification into two parts. The distinction is based upon the value of
bke_state[0] on entry of the method. If this state is PreBKE the card has
not been issued yet and hence an exception must be thrown and the resulting
state will still be PreBKE. In any other state we allow this message to come in.
If the receiving succeeds, the resulting state will be Msg1Received, otherwise
an exception is thrown and the applet will go to InitialState. Note that this
method has as a postcondition that the state will be Msg1Received. This state
does not appear in the specification of process. This is because the process
method will always call sendMsg2 and this method will always change the state
–either to Msg2Sent or to InitialState– before process terminates.
/*@ behavior
@ requires bke_state[0] != PRE_BKE;
@ ensures bke_state[0] == MSG1_RECEIVED;
@ signals (Exception) (bke_state[0] == INIT);
@ also
@ exceptional_behavior
@ requires bke_state[0] == PRE_BKE;
@ signals (Exception) (bke_state[0] == PRE_BKE);
@*/
private void receiveMsg1(APDU apdu) throws ISOException
4.2 Runtime checking with the JML tool
The JML runtime assertion checker [?] takes as input Java source files annotated
with JML specifications. It augments the source files with runtime checks based
on the JML specifications so that all invariants, constraints, pre- and postcon-
ditions are checked at runtime and any violation result in a special exception
being thrown.
We used this tool to check the Java Card code of our applet against our
JML specification. To do this we could not execute the code on an actual smart
card, but we had to use a smart card simulator instead. (The reason for this
is that the runtime assertion checker uses some Java API classes that are not
part of the more restricted Java Card API, and are consequently not available
on Java Card smart cards.) The smart card simulator we used was Sun’s Java
Card Workstation Development Environment (JCWDE).
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In this setup we were able to find quite a few mistakes in our JML specifi-
cation. Typically these errors were caused by forgetting to specify some of the
implicit transactions from Fig. 6.
4.3 Static checking with ESC/Java
ESC/Java [13], the ‘extended static checker’ for Java is a tool developed at
Compaq SRC for automatically checking JML-annotated code2. The tool uses a
theorem prover to automatically verify that assertions in Java code are correct,
without any user interaction. The tool is neither sound nor complete, i.e. it can
warn about possible violations of assertions that cannot happen, and fail to
warn about possible violations of assertions that can happen. Still, the tool is
very useful for debugging Java(Card) code and formal specifications, as it can
provide quick feedback pointing out possible mistakes, especially since, unlike
for runtime assertion checking, no test scenarios are needed for using ESC/Java.
ESC/Java has already been used with great success in debugging Java Card
source code, see [4].
The kind of JML specifications we have written are well within the range of
what ESC/Java can handle. Running ESC/Java on our annotated applet pointed
out several mistakes. For example, our initial JML specifications did not allow
for the fact that on any point in the protocol the process method may receive a
select APDU, in which case the applet reverts to the INIT. In particular we did
not find this mistake when we used the JML runtime assertion checker, simply
because this possibility wasn’t included in our test scenarios. On the other hand
runtime assertion checking can deal with the actual contents of APDUs being
sent, which is something ESC/Java cannot.
Note that ESC/Java requires ESC/Java specifications of the API classes used
by the applet, such as the javacard.framework.APDU. Here we used the formal
JML specifications for the Java Card API version 2.1.1, discussed in [11,10] and
available on-line via http://www.verificard.org.
4.4 Card tears and invariants
Card tears cause a special problem for invariants specified in JML. JML allows
an invariant to be temporarily broken during the execution of a method. But
if a card tear should happen at such a point, this could cause problems later,
when the applet continues its operation in a state where some of its invariants
are broken.
Such problems will not show up in the runtime checking with the JML tool,
as the simulator we use does not simulate card tears, and will also not show up
in the static checking with ESC/Java, as ESC/Java has been designed for Java
and does not take the peculiarities of Java Card into account.
There are three ways in which problems with a temporarily broken invariant
at the moment of a card tear can be avoided:
2 Actually, the specification language ESC/Java uses is a ‘dialect’ of JML.
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1. The invariant could become re-established the next time the smart card
powers up again, as a result of the resetting of all transient memory to its
default initial value.
2. The invariant could become re-established when the applet is selected again,
namely if the applet itself takes care to restore the invariant when it receives
its select APDU.
3. Finally, Java Card offers a so-called transaction mechanism. By invoking
special methods from the Java Card API one can turn any sequence of
Java instructions into an atomic action. When the smart card powers up,
the smart card operating system will roll-back to the pre state of such a
sequence of instructions if it has been interrupted by a card tear.
For every invariant in our JML specification we manually checked the following
properties:
– Is this invariant ever temporarily broken during a method?
– If so, is the invariant re-established by one of the three mechanisms men-
tioned above ?
Because the Java Card transaction mechanism is not supported by the tools
ESC/Java and JML, our applet does not use this functionality, and hence we
never have to rely on the third way to re-establish invariants after a card tear
listed above.
5 Conclusions
We started with an abstract description of a security protocol, for bilateral key
exchange, for which we had earlier used Casper [8] and FDR2 [14] to prove its
correctness. This paper describes how, based on a few explicit design decisions,
we refined this protocol in several stages to an actual implementation, where
one of the agents is implemented as a Java Card smart card applet. It should
be stressed that our interest here is not the outcome of our decisions, but rather
the decision making-process itself. The JML language was used for a formal
specification of the Java Card code. It turns out that this specification can be
systematically derived from the finite automaton in Fig. 6, the final refinement
of the abstract protocol, that includes card tears and the handling of all possible
exceptions that may arise. We have checked that the implementation meets these
specifications, using runtime assertion checking with the JML tool, and doing
static checking using ESC/Java.
Implementing a security protocol on a smart card involves some non-straight-
forward decisions: decisions 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Both static checking and runtime checking turn out to be good methods to
check JML specifications of applets. Although they will not notice all problems,
they certainly help to improve the code and the specifications. Both methods
have their own advantages and disadvantages, therefore it is a good idea to use
both ESC/Java and JML, although they are not specific Java Card tools.
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In [9] a list of important security properties for Java Card applets is presented.
The JML specifications for our applet include several of these properties, e.g.
‘service control’ and ‘error prediction’, but not all of them. Some properties, most
notably ‘secure information flow’, have been taken into account while coding, but
cannot be specified in JML in any convenient way.
Future Work
The most important open question is how we can prove that the refinements
of the protocol ensure the same security properties that the original protocol
establishes. We can think of two ways to do this.
We already used the FDR2 model checker to prove that the original abstract
protocol establishes authenticity and secrecy. We also tried to use it to check the
same properties of our refinements of the protocol. However, FDR2 had problems
with the recursion in these refinements, which allow infinite traces. It might be a
good idea to spend some more time in defining this recursive CSP model. Maybe
we could get FDR2 to prove that our security properties are valid for traces of
a certain maximum length, which would give us some more confidence that the
refinements preserve the properties of the original protocol.
Alternatively, we could investigate properties of the refinements between the
different automata. For example, one obvious property that holds for the refine-
ments is trace inclusion. Another property is that any trace that leads to the
state KeyEstablished in the final refinement Fig. 6 will have a tail that leads
to the state Msg3Received in Fig. 2. Intuitively, such properties seem sufficient
to guarantee that our refinements preserve the security properties of the original
protocol. However, we have not formally proved this yet.
It would be interesting to experiment with model checkers, such as Up-
paal [15], to check interesting properties of the automata describing the protocol.
(In fact, we already used Uppaal to draw all the diagrams in this paper.) Even
if we are not able to check typical security properties, we might for example be
able to rule out the possibility of deadlock.
Maybe it is worthwhile to develop new versions of ESC/Java and JML in
order to cope with features specific to Java Card, such as the transaction mech-
anism and the possibility of card tears.
After static checking with ESC/Java and runtime checker for JML, the next
step would be to prove the correctness of the JML specification with respect to
the Java Card implementation using the LOOP tool [6], in combination with
the theorem prover PVS [?]. See [2] for a discussion of examples of such cor-
rectness proofs. Such a formal verification would provide a much higher level of
assurance that our implementation does indeed meet its specification than the
checking with ESC/Java. However, it would also require much more effort, as
such verifications are very labor-intensive. For the current JML specifications,
we do not think such an additional effort would be worthwhile, as ESC/Java
seems reliable enough when dealing with these kinds of properties.
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